Thin Political Markets in Accounting and Beyond: Lessons for Leadership Education
Ramanna Karthik ()
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Ramanna Karthik: Harvard Business School and University of Oxford, Oxford, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
Accounting, Economics, and Law: A Convivium, 2017, vol. 7, issue 2, 43-50
Abstract:
Thin political markets are regulatory processes characterised by two features: first, a concentrated commercial interest that is also the source of necessary experiential expertise; second, low participation from the general interest driven by low issue salience. Thin political markets generate capture in two ways distinct from the classic collective-action scenario: first, that the nature of necessary expertise is tacit or implicit – knowledge that comes from doing; second, that the issues at stake evince little interest from the general public or its intermediaries such as the media or politicians. The challenge in thin political markets is that business leaders, who are the subject-matter experts, are both the source of capture and the only realistic prospect for solution. I discuss ways in which we can address this challenge.
Keywords: political economy; public policy; accounting; political process (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bpj:aelcon:v:7:y:2017:i:2:p:43-50:n:7
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DOI: 10.1515/ael-2017-0011
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