Evolutionary Analysis of the Assignment of Property Rights

Atsushi Tsuneki

Asian Journal of Law and Economics, 2025, vol. 16, issue 3, 363-374

Abstract: This study aims to determine a theoretical basis for the assignment of property rights by applying an evolutionary game model in which two types of workers apply for their effort for the increase of the property value. By extending the evolutionary game approach to determine the theoretical basis supporting that the property rights institution is preceded by the evolutionarily developed human psyche, due originally to Eswaran and Neary, the resulting evolutionary stable set of preferences differs from them since the relative endowment effect hardwired depends on the productivity difference between the two parties.

Keywords: evolutionary game model; property right; endowment effect (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 K3 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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Working Paper: An Evolutionary Analysis of the Assignment of Property Rights (2017)
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DOI: 10.1515/ajle-2024-0125

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