The Political Economy of the Implementation of the Bankruptcy Law of China

Zuofa Wang ()
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Zuofa Wang: Professor of Guizhou University of Finance and Economics; Adjunct Professor of Center of Law and Finance of Liaoning University; and Institute of Finance of GuiZhou University of Finance and Economics, Hua Xi College Town, Hua Xi District, Guiyang City, GuiZhou, China

Asian Journal of Law and Economics, 2015, vol. 6, issue 2, 249-281

Abstract: The implementation of the bankruptcy law of China deviates much from the expectation of the legislature. This article draws on political economy analysis, especially the interest group approach, to provide an explanation of the causes of the deviation and predict what the future of the modification and reform of the law might be. This article also describes the China context in using public choice theory to explain legal issues.

Keywords: bankruptcy law of China; bargaining; expectation of legislature; implementation; interest group (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bpj:ajlecn:v:6:y:2015:i:2:p:249-281:n:1

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DOI: 10.1515/ajle-2014-0001

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