Incentive Contracting with an Independent Underwriter: Does It Benefit Insurers?
Gao Siwei () and
Plehn-Dujowich Jose M.
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Gao Siwei: Accounting, Finance and Information Systems, Eastern Kentucky University, 521 Lancaster Ave., Richmond, KY 40475, USA
Plehn-Dujowich Jose M.: Accounting, Haas School of Business, University of California Berkeley, Berkeley, CA, USA
Asia-Pacific Journal of Risk and Insurance, 2015, vol. 9, issue 2, 231-259
In this article, we propose a model consisting of an insurance distribution channel compensation scheme, paying special attention to the insurer’s choice of distribution system in both single-period and multi-period settings. We find that the risk factor is the key element in both the insurer’s choice of distribution channel and the distribution channel compensation scheme. The advantage of having an independent underwriter is mainly manifested in lines of business that are more risky. Our analysis suggests that a profit-sharing contingent-commission scheme serves as a risk-sharing mechanism and is especially effective with risky business lines.
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