The Role of Replication-Invariance: Two Answers Concerning the Problem of Fair Division When Preferences Are Single-Peaked

Bettina Klaus ()

The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, 2010, vol. 10, issue 1, 14

Abstract: We consider the problem of allocating an infinitely divisible commodity among a group of agents with single-peaked preferences. A rule that has played a central role in the previous analysis of the problem is the so-called uniform rule. Thomson (1995b) proved that the uniform rule is the only rule satisfying Pareto optimality, no-envy, one-sided population-monotonicity, and replication-invariance. Replacing one-sided population-monotonicity by one-sided replacement-domination yields another characterization of the uniform rule (Thomson, 1997a). Until now, the independence of replication-invariance from the other properties in these characterizations was an open problem. In this note we prove this independence by means of a single example.

Keywords: fair allocation; single-peaked preferences; population-monotonicity; replacement-domination; replication-invariance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.2202/1935-1704.1650 (text/html)
For access to full text, subscription to the journal or payment for the individual article is required.

Related works:
Working Paper: The role of replication-invariance: two answers concerning the problem of fair division when preferences are single-peaked (2007)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bpj:bejtec:v:10:y:2010:i:1:n:14

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
https://www.degruyter.com/journal/key/bejte/html

DOI: 10.2202/1935-1704.1650

Access Statistics for this article

The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics is currently edited by Burkhard C. Schipper

More articles in The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics from De Gruyter
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Peter Golla ().