Understanding UPP

Epstein Roy J. and Rubinfeld Daniel L
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Epstein Roy J.: Boston College, rje@royepstein.com
Rubinfeld Daniel L: University of California, Berkeley, Law School, drubinfeld@law.berkeley.edu

The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, 2010, vol. 10, issue 1, 12

Abstract: Joseph Farrell and Carl Shapiro have proposed a measure of Upward Pricing Pressure (UPP) as offering a presumption of anticompetitive unilateral effects in a merger. We explain that the underlying framework (which relies on Bertrand competition) is in fact a special case of a more general merger simulation methodology. We discuss the strengths and weaknesses of the framework as a policy tool.

Keywords: merger analysis; unilateral effects (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
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DOI: 10.2202/1935-1704.1641

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