Optimal Quality Scores in Sponsored Search Auctions: Full Extraction of Advertisers' Surplus

Kiho Yoon

The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, 2010, vol. 10, issue 1, 11

Abstract: This paper shows that the quality scores in sponsored search auctions can be optimally chosen to extract all the advertisers' surplus. The reason for the full extraction result is that the quality scores may effectively set all the bidders' valuations equal to the highest valuation, which induces intense bidding competition.

Keywords: online advertising; sponsored search; quality score; full extraction (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.2202/1935-1704.1649 (text/html)
For access to full text, subscription to the journal or payment for the individual article is required.

Related works:
Working Paper: Optimal quality scores in sponsored search auctions: Full extraction of advertisers' surplus (2009)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bpj:bejtec:v:10:y:2010:i:1:n:28

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
https://www.degruyter.com/view/j/bejte

DOI: 10.2202/1935-1704.1649

Access Statistics for this article

The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics is currently edited by Burkhard C. Schipper

More articles in The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics from De Gruyter
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Peter Golla ().