EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Multiproduct Duopoly with Vertical Differentiation

Cheng Yi-Ling, Shin-Kun Peng (speng@econ.sinica.edu.tw) and Takatoshi Tabuchi
Additional contact information
Cheng Yi-Ling: Tunghai University and Academia Sinica, ylcheng@thu.edu.tw

The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, 2011, vol. 11, issue 1, 29

Abstract: This paper investigates a two-stage competition in a vertically differentiated industry, where each firm produces an arbitrary number of similar qualities and sells them to heterogeneous consumers. The number of products, qualities, prices, and the extent of the market coverage are endogenously determined. We show that when unit costs of quality improvement are increasing and quadratic, each firm has an incentive to provide a disconnected set of similar qualities approximating a continuum. The finding contrasts sharply with the single-quality outcome when the market coverage is exogenously determined. We also show that allowing for multiple qualities intensifies the level of competition, lowers the profit of each firm, and raises the consumer surplus and the social welfare in comparison to the single-quality duopoly.

Keywords: multiproduct firms; market segmentation; quality competition; continuum of qualities; vertical product differentiation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.2202/1935-1704.1800 (text/html)
For access to full text, subscription to the journal or payment for the individual article is required.

Related works:
Working Paper: Multiproduct Duopoly with Vertical Di¤erentiation (2010) Downloads
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bpj:bejtec:v:11:y:2011:i:1:n:16

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
https://www.degruyter.com/journal/key/bejte/html

DOI: 10.2202/1935-1704.1800

Access Statistics for this article

The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics is currently edited by Burkhard C. Schipper

More articles in The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics from De Gruyter
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Peter Golla (peter.golla@degruyter.com).

 
Page updated 2025-03-19
Handle: RePEc:bpj:bejtec:v:11:y:2011:i:1:n:16