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Implementation of the Core in College Admissions Problems When Colleagues Matter

Serkan Küçükşenel ()

The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, 2011, vol. 11, issue 1, 1-14

Abstract: This paper presents mechanisms implementing the core correspondence of many-to-one matching markets, such as college admissions problems, where the students have preferences over the other students who would attend the same college. We first present a sequential mechanism implementing the core. We then show that simple two-stage mechanisms, which mimics the real-life processes, cannot be used to implement the core correspondence in subgame perfect Nash equilibrium even with strong assumptions on agents’ preferences.

Date: 2011
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DOI: 10.2202/1935-1704.1772

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