Make-or-Buy Decisions and the Manipulability of Performance Measures

Fredrik Andersson ()

The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, 2011, vol. 11, issue 1, 30

Abstract: The make-or-buy decision is analyzed in a simple framework combining contractual incompleteness with the existence of an imperfect but contractible performance measure. Contractual incompleteness gives rise to two regimes, identified with make and buy. The performance measure on which comprehensive contracts can be written is imperfect in the sense of being subject to manipulation. The performance incentives faced by the agent are stronger in the "buy" regime. A positive (negative) impact -- or "externality" -- of manipulation on true performance favors make (buy).

Keywords: make-or-buy decision; manipulation; outsourcing (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Make-or-buy Decisions and the Manipulability of Performance Measures (2009)
Working Paper: Make-or-buy decisions and the manipulability of performance measures (2009)
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DOI: 10.2202/1935-1704.1790

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