Commitment versus Flexibility in Enforcement Games

Leshem Shmuel and Tabbach Avraham D.
Additional contact information
Leshem Shmuel: USC Law School, sleshem@law.usc.edu
Tabbach Avraham D.: Tel Aviv University, adtabbac@post.tau.ac.il

The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, 2012, vol. 12, issue 1, 42

Abstract: This paper studies the role of commitment in the design of enforcement mechanisms when enforcement can remedy harm from non-compliance. We consider a game between an enforcement authority ("enforcer") and an offender in which either the enforcer or the offender may act as a Stackelberg leader. The enforcer must choose whether to move first by committing to an enforcement strategy--thereby directly affecting the level of non-compliance; or rather let the offender make the first move--thereby calibrating the level of enforcement to the actual level of non-compliance. We show that the value of commitment to the enforcer depends on each player's responsiveness to a change in the other player's strategy choice. Commitment to an enforcement strategy is thus not always in the enforcer's interest.

Keywords: Enforcement; inspection game; Stackelberg; strategic complements; strategic substitutes (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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DOI: 10.1515/1935-1704.1833

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