A Simple Bargaining Procedure for the Myerson Value

Noemí Navarro and Perea Andres ()
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Perea Andres: Epicenter and Department of Quantitative Economics, Maastricht University, Maastricht, Netherlands

The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, 2013, vol. 13, issue 1, 131-150

Abstract: We consider situations where the cooperation and negotiation possibilities between pairs of agents are given by an undirected graph. Every connected component of agents has a value, which is the total surplus the agents can generate by working together. We present a simple, sequential, bilateral bargaining procedure, in which at every stage the two agents in a link, (i,j) bargain about their share from cooperation in the connected component they are part of. We show that this procedure yields the Myerson value (Myerson, 1997) if the marginal value of any link in a connected component is increasing in the number of links in that connected component.

Keywords: Myerson value; networks; bargaining; cooperation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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Working Paper: A Simple Bargaining Procedure for the Myerson Value (2010)
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DOI: 10.1515/bejte-2012-0006

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