EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Competition in a Posted-Salary Matching Market under Private Information

Luke Boosey

The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, 2016, vol. 16, issue 2, 599-631

Abstract: We study a posted-salary labor market in which firms engage in salary competition. Firms’ preferences over workers are private information, creating uncertainty about competitive pressure for different workers. We consider a baseline 2-firm, 2-worker model, then extend the analysis to larger markets by replicating the baseline. We characterize the unique Bayesian- Nash equilibrium, in which each firm type chooses a distributional strategy with interval support in the salary space. The main result shows that competition is localized, in the sense that firm types with a common most preferred worker choose non-overlapping, adjacent supports. We also provide numerical results to show that the equilibrium strategies in finite replicated markets converge to the corresponding equilibrium strategies in a market with a continuum of firms and workers.

Date: 2016
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1515/bejte-2015-0022 (text/html)
For access to full text, subscription to the journal or payment for the individual article is required.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bpj:bejtec:v:16:y:2016:i:2:p:599-631:n:8

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
https://www.degruyter.com/view/j/bejte

DOI: 10.1515/bejte-2015-0022

Access Statistics for this article

The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics is currently edited by Burkhard C. Schipper

More articles in The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics from De Gruyter
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Peter Golla ().

 
Page updated 2023-01-09
Handle: RePEc:bpj:bejtec:v:16:y:2016:i:2:p:599-631:n:8