A Nonspeculation Theorem with an Application to Committee Design

Chen Jidong (), Fey Mark () and Kristopher W. Ramsay ()
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Chen Jidong: Business School, Beijing Normal University, Beijing, China
Fey Mark: Department of Political Science, University of Rochester, 109 Harkness Hall, Rochester, NY 14627, USA
Kristopher W. Ramsay: Department of Politics, Princeton University, 038 Corwin Hall, Princeton, NJ 08544, USA

The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, 2017, vol. 17, issue 2, 10

Abstract: Various well known agreement theorems show that if players have common knowledge of actions and a “veto" action is available to every player, then they cannot agree to forgo a Pareto optimal outcome simply because of private information in settings with unique equilibrium. We establish a nonspeculation theorem which is more general than previous results and is applicable to political and economic situations that generate multiple equilibria. We demonstrate an application of our result to the problem of designing an independent committee free of private persuasion.

Date: 2017
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DOI: 10.1515/bejte-2015-0103

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