Getting a Job through Unemployed Friends: A Social Network Perspective

Zhang Rui ()
Additional contact information
Zhang Rui: International School of Economics and Management, Capital University of Economics and Business, 100070Beijing, China

The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, 2017, vol. 17, issue 2, 20

Abstract: We develop a model in which unemployed workers can pass along unwanted job information to other unemployed friends within social networks. Compared with the case in the absence of social networks, we first show in an economy where networks are equal in size that unemployment rate is lower. In terms of social welfare, social planner prefers workers becoming more selective than the decentralized equilibrium. When social networks differ in size, increasing the size difference is beneficial for unemployed workers with large networks but detrimental to those with small networks; in addition, the unemployment rate decreases with the size difference. However, because of the dilution effect, as the proportion of unemployed workers with large networks increases, it eventually results in losses for all unemployed workers, and the unemployment rate may follow a non-monotonic pattern.

Keywords: disutility; selectivity; social network (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J01 J30 J81 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1515/bejte-2016-0055 (text/html)
For access to full text, subscription to the journal or payment for the individual article is required.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bpj:bejtec:v:17:y:2017:i:2:p:20:n:6

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
https://www.degruyter.com/journal/key/bejte/html

DOI: 10.1515/bejte-2016-0055

Access Statistics for this article

The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics is currently edited by Burkhard C. Schipper

More articles in The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics from De Gruyter
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Peter Golla ().