Stability of Equilibrium Outcomes under Deferred Acceptance: Acyclicity and Dropping Strategies
Tello Benjamín ()
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Tello Benjamín: Dirección General de Investigación Económica, Banco de México, Ciudad de México, México
The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, 2017, vol. 17, issue 2, 9
We consider two-sided many-to-one matching markets where hospitals have responsive preferences. In this context, we study the preference revelation game induced by the student-proposing deferred acceptance mechanism. We show that acyclicity of the hospitals’ preference profile (Romero-Medina and Triossi 2013a. “Acyclicity and Singleton Cores in Matching Markets.” Economics Letters 118 (1):237–9) is a necessary and sufficient condition to ensure that the outcome of every Nash equilibrium in which each hospital plays a dropping strategy is stable.
Keywords: matching; stability; acyclicity; dropping strategies; Nash equilibria (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D47 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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