The core of a strategic game

Parkash Chander

The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, 2019, vol. 19, issue 1, 10

Abstract: In this paper, I introduce and study the γ $\gamma$-core of a general strategic game. I first show that the γ $\gamma$-core of an arbitrary strategic game is smaller than the conventional α $\alpha$- and β $\beta$- cores. I then consider the partition function form of a general strategic game and show that a prominent class of partition function games admit nonempty γ $\gamma$-cores. Finally, I show that each γ $\gamma$-core payoff vector (a cooperative solution) can be supported as an equilibrium outcome of an intuitive non-cooperative game and the grand coalition is the unique equilibrium outcome if and only if the γ $\gamma$-core is non-empty.

Keywords: strategic game; core; partition function; repeated game; Nash program (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
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DOI: 10.1515/bejte-2017-0155

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