Uniform Price Auctions with Asymmetric Bidders

Sylvain Bourjade

The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, 2019, vol. 19, issue 1, 14

Abstract: In uniform price auctions, multiple prices are sustainable in equilibrium as a result of the market power of bidders. I show that low price equilibria are removed in a framework with asymmetric bidders who cannot anticipate the seller’s rationing strategy. Attracting high cost bidders’ participation in the auction induces the low cost bidders to bid more aggressively in order to eliminate the high cost bidders. Ex-post optimal equilibria with non-increasing demand schedules only exist when the seller is allowed to use any degree of rationing.

Keywords: asymmetric bidders; EU UTS; treasury auctions; uniform price auctions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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DOI: 10.1515/bejte-2016-0188

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