Irrelevance of the Strategic Variable in the Case of Relative Performance Maximization

Philipowski Robert ()
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Philipowski Robert: Debeka Lebensversicherungsverein a. G., 56058Koblenz, Germany

The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, 2019, vol. 19, issue 1, 7

Abstract: We study games with two possibilities for the strategic variable and find that contrary to the Nash equilibrium the evolutionarily stable equilibrium – provided it uniquely exists – does not depend on which possibility is chosen. Our result generalizes recent findings of Satoh, Tanaka and Wagener who studied this issue in various special cases.

Keywords: games with two possibilities for the strategic variable; relative performance; evolutionarily stable strategy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
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DOI: 10.1515/bejte-2017-0012

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