A Simple and Procedurally Fair Game Form for Nash Implementation of the No-Envy Solution

Makoto Hagiwara

The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, 2020, vol. 20, issue 1, 5

Abstract: We consider the allocation problem of infinitely divisible resources with at least three agents. For this problem, Thomson (Games and Economic Behavior, 52: 186-200, 2005) and Doğan (Games and Economic Behavior, 98: 165-171, 2016) propose “simple” but not “procedurally fair” game forms which implement the “no-envy” solution in Nash equilibria. By contrast, Galbiati (Economics Letters, 100: 72-75, 2008) constructs a procedurally fair but not simple game form which implements the no-envy solution in Nash equilibria. In this paper, we design a both simple and procedurally fair game form which implements the no-envy solution in Nash equilibria.

Keywords: Nash implementation; no-envy solution; procedural fairness; simple game form (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D71 D78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
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DOI: 10.1515/bejte-2019-0051

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