The Effects of Entry when Monopolistic Competition and Oligopoly Coexist
Fujiwara Kenji ()
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Fujiwara Kenji: School of Economics, Kwansei Gakuin University, Uegahara 1-1-155, Nishinomiya, Hyogo 662-8501, Japan
The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, 2020, vol. 20, issue 2, 11
Abstract:
This paper proposes a model of a continuum of industries in which some industries are monopolistically competitive, the others are oligopolistic, and they interact in a labor market. We use this model to examine the effects of entry of oligopolistic firms. We show that this raises the equilibrium wage and induces exit of monopolistically competitive firms. Then, we find that the profits of each oligopolistic firm and the whole oligopolistic industry decrease. Finally, we establish that if the elasticity of substitution is the same in all industries, welfare improves as a result of an increase in the oligopolistic firms.
Keywords: monopolistic competition; oligopoly; general equilibrium; entry; welfare (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D43 L13 L40 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bpj:bejtec:v:20:y:2020:i:2:p:11:n:1
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DOI: 10.1515/bejte-2017-0161
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