Working Time under Alternative Pay Contracts in the Ride-Sharing Industry
Filippo Belloc ()
The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, 2022, vol. 22, issue 1, 281-295
Abstract:
We study hours worked by drivers in the peer-to-peer transportation sector with cross-side network effects. Medallion lease (regulated market), commission-based (Uber-like pay) and profit-sharing (“pure” taxi coop) compensation schemes are compared. Our static model shows that network externalities matter, depending on the number of active drivers. When the number of drivers is limited, in the presence of positive network effects, a regulated system always induces more hours worked, while the commission fee influences the comparative incentives towards working time of Uber-like pay versus profit-sharing. When the number of drivers is infinite (or close to it), the influence of network externalities on optimal working time vanishes. Our model helps identifying which is the pay scheme that best remunerates longer working times and offers insights to regulators seeking to improve the intensive margin of coverage by taxi services.
Keywords: working time; Uber; network effects; ride-sharing; pay schemes (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J22 J33 L91 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bpj:bejtec:v:22:y:2022:i:1:p:281-295:n:11
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DOI: 10.1515/bejte-2020-0026
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