Expert Panels with Selective Investigation

Gong Qiang () and Yang Huanxing ()
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Gong Qiang: Wenlan School of Business, Zhongnan University of Economics and Law, Wuhan, China
Yang Huanxing: Department of Economics, Ohio State University, 1945 N. High St., Columbus, OH 43210, USA

The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, 2022, vol. 22, issue 2, 369-404

Abstract: In a model of information disclosure with multiple experts we compare homogeneous panels and diverse panels. The distinguishing feature of our model is selective investigation: there are multiple aspects relevant to decision making and each expert can strategically choose some aspects to investigate. We show that homogeneous panels lead to unbalanced investigation and unbalanced action, while under diverse panels both investigations and actions are balanced. In most circumstances, diverse panels perform better than homogeneous panels.

Keywords: information disclosure; multiple aspects; selective investigation; panel design (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 D83 L20 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
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DOI: 10.1515/bejte-2021-0010

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