Double Implementation in Dominant Strategy Equilibria and Ex-Post Equilibria with Private Values

Makoto Hagiwara

The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, 2023, vol. 23, issue 2, 663-678

Abstract: We consider the implementation problem for incomplete information and private values. We investigate double implementability of social choice functions in dominant strategy equilibria and ex-post equilibria. We define a new strategic axiom that implies “strategy-proofness” and that is implied by “secure strategy-proofness,” but the converse of these relationships does not hold. We call it “weak secure-strategy-proofness.” We show that a social choice function is doubly implementable if and only if it is weakly securely-strategy-proof.

Keywords: double implementation; dominant strategy equilibrium; ex-post equilibrium; weak secure-strategy-proofness; private values (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D71 D78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
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Working Paper: Double Implementation in Dominant Strategy Equilibria and Ex Post Equilibria with Private Values (2019)
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DOI: 10.1515/bejte-2021-0115

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