Voluntary Partnerships for Equally Sharing Contribution Costs: Theoretical Aspects and Experimental Evidence

Buso Irene Maria (), Di Cagno Daniela (), Gueth Werner () and Spadoni Lorenzo ()
Additional contact information
Buso Irene Maria: Department of Economics, University of Bologna, Bologna, Italy
Di Cagno Daniela: Department of Economics and Finance, Luiss University, Rome, Italy
Gueth Werner: Max-Planck-Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Bonn, Germany
Spadoni Lorenzo: Department of Economics and Law, 18962 University of Cassino and Southern Lazio , Cassino, Italy

The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, 2025, vol. 25, issue 1, 1-41

Abstract: We investigate, both theoretically and experimentally, an institutional mechanism designed to enhance cooperation. In this mechanism, contributors have the option to voluntarily contribute to the public good and decide whether to join a (sub)group where partners equally share the contribution cost. Theoretically, stable cost-sharing partnerships enhance efficiency since their partners fully contribute, while outsiders would free-ride. Our data reveal that individual joining and contribution behaviors do not always align with benchmark predictions: partnerships are not always formed, and when they are, they are not always of the optimal size; partners often contribute less than maximally, and outsiders more than minimally. Nonetheless, we document systematic evidence of partnership formation and significantly improved provision of public goods across rounds.

Keywords: public good; group formation; group size; experiments (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C92 D85 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1515/bejte-2024-0043 (text/html)
For access to full text, subscription to the journal or payment for the individual article is required.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bpj:bejtec:v:25:y:2025:i:1:p:1-41:n:1004

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
https://www.degruyte ... urnal/key/bejte/html

DOI: 10.1515/bejte-2024-0043

Access Statistics for this article

The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics is currently edited by Burkhard C. Schipper

More articles in The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics from De Gruyter
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Peter Golla ().