Best Agendas in Multi-Issue Bargaining

Francesca Flamini

The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, 2007, vol. 7, issue 1, 13

Abstract: We study the agenda selection problem faced by a multi-issue committee when there can be (small) delays between the negotiations of different issues. We show that the presence of these delays affects the interplay of the forces in the bargaining game and solves the indeterminacy of equilibria. In particular, a unique SPE can be established among sequential bargaining procedures. In equilibrium, players discuss the most important issue first.

Keywords: bargaining; agenda; subgame perfect equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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DOI: 10.2202/1935-1704.1368

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