Taxes versus Permits in a Two-Stage Duopoly

Vetter Henrik
Additional contact information
Vetter Henrik: Statsbiblioteket - Denmark, hv@statsbiblioteket.dk

The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, 2007, vol. 7, issue 1, 15

Abstract: In a two-stage Cournot oligopoly cost minimization sometimes calls for ex ante identical firms to invest in diverse technologies. It is an implication of this result that it might be optimal to treat identical duopolistic polluters asymmetrically. We discuss the efficiency properties of a per-unit tax and a tradable permit when ex ante identical duopolists should ideally invest asymmetrically. It is argued that a tradable permit is efficient in promoting differential investments.

Keywords: environmental regulation; taxes; permits; asymmetric behavior (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007
References: View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.2202/1935-1704.1318 (text/html)
For access to full text, subscription to the journal or payment for the individual article is required.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bpj:bejtec:v:7:y:2007:i:1:n:17

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
https://www.degruyter.com/journal/key/bejte/html

DOI: 10.2202/1935-1704.1318

Access Statistics for this article

The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics is currently edited by Burkhard C. Schipper

More articles in The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics from De Gruyter
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Peter Golla ().