Von Neumann-Morgenstern Stable Set Bridges Time-Preferences to the Nash Solution

Klaus Kultti () and Hannu Vartiainen ()

The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, 2007, vol. 7, issue 1, 26

Abstract: We apply the von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set to the n-player cake division problem. Only time-preferences á la Rubinstein (1982) are assumed. The stable set is defined with respect to the following dominance relation: x dominates y if there is a player who prefers x over y even with one period lag. The Nash bargaining solution is characterized in the language of stable sets. Through the characterization, we establish the existence and uniqueness of the Nash solution.

Keywords: stable set; bargaining; Nash solution; time-preferences (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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DOI: 10.2202/1935-1704.1251

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