A Decentralized Market for a Perishable Good

Anwar Ahmed W and József Sákovics
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Anwar Ahmed W: University of Edinburgh, Ahmed.Anwar@ed.ac.uk

The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, 2007, vol. 7, issue 1, 25

Abstract: We characterize the steady state of a market with random matching and bargaining, where the sellers' goods can perish overnight. Generically, the quantity traded is suboptimal, prices are dispersed and there is a dead-weight loss caused by excess supply or demand. In the limit as the cost of staying in the market tends to zero, only the amount of trade tends to the efficient level, the other two non-competitive characteristics remain. We discuss the implications of these findings on the foundations of competitive equilibrium and on the robustness of the results in the literature on durable-good markets.

Keywords: perishability; decentralized market; queuing externality (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007
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Working Paper: A decentralized market for a perishable good (2006)
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DOI: 10.2202/1935-1704.1312

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