Incentive Schemes in Peer-to-Peer Networks

Oksana Loginova (), Lu Haibin and X. Wang ()
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Lu Haibin: University of Missouri, luhaibin@missouri.edu

The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, 2009, vol. 9, issue 1, 24

Abstract: In this paper we study the optimal file-sharing mechanism in a peer-to-peer network with a mechanism design perspective. This mechanism improves upon existing incentive schemes. In particular, we show that peer-approved scheme is never optimal and service-quality scheme is optimal only under certain circumstances. Moreover, we find that the optimal mechanism can be implemented by a mixture of peer-approved and service-quality schemes.

Keywords: peer-to-peer networks; file sharing incentive schemes; mechanism design (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
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DOI: 10.2202/1935-1704.1501

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