Sequential Auctions with Multi-Unit Demands

Rodriguez Gustavo E
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Rodriguez Gustavo E: Long Island University - Brooklyn Campus, gustavo.rodriguez@liu.edu

The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, 2009, vol. 9, issue 1, 35

Abstract: I study sequential second price auctions with multi-unit demands in a complete information setting, focusing on cases in which payoffs are non-separable as a consequence of decreasing marginal values. At the equilibrium outcome a buyer behaves as a monopsonist with respect to the residual supply, which raises the possibility of inefficiency. Moreover, I construct an equilibrium that exhibits declining prices, a fact that has been empirically observed.

Keywords: sequential auctions; multi-unit demands; declining prices (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
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DOI: 10.2202/1935-1704.1534

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