Evolutionary Dynamics and Long-Run Selection

Feinberg Yossi ()
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Feinberg Yossi: Stanford University

The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, 2006, vol. 6, issue 1, 28

Abstract: We study the emergence and nature of long-run behavior of continuous state space dynamics that are subjected to random shocks. It is shown that the fine details of the underlying deterministic dynamics may be crucial in determining the evolution of the system. In particular, a risk dominated strategy can emerge in an evolutionary game subject to symmetric decaying perturbations.

Date: 2006
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DOI: 10.2202/1534-5963.1239

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