A One-Period Version of Rubinstein's Bargaining Game

Robert Evans

The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, 2003, vol. 3, issue 1, 8

Abstract: A one-period, simultaneous-offers bargaining game is analyzed in which, for each player, there is a small probability that his or her proposal will not reach the other player. The unique pure strategy equilibrium offers are identical to those of the Rubinstein (1982) infinite-horizon, alternating-offers bargaining game. This provides a novel interpretation of Rubinstein's result, as well as a new non-cooperative implementation of the Nash Bargaining Solution.

Keywords: Rubinstein bargaining; simultaneous offers; Nash bargaining solution (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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DOI: 10.2202/1534-5971.1066

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