Uniform Proofs of Order Independence for Various Strategy Elimination Procedures

Apt Krzysztof R.
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Apt Krzysztof R.: National University of Singapore, apt@cwi.nl

The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, 2004, vol. 4, issue 1, 48

Abstract: We provide elementary and uniform proofs of order independence for various strategy elimination procedures for finite strategic games, both for dominance by pure and by mixed strategies. The proofs follow the same pattern and focus on the structural properties of the dominance relations. They rely on Newman's Lemma established in 1942 and related results on the abstract reduction systems.

Keywords: dominance strategies; order independence; Newman’s Lemma (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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DOI: 10.2202/1534-5971.1141

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