Utility Equivalence in Auctions

Shlomit Hon-Snir

The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, 2005, vol. 5, issue 1, 13

Abstract: Auctions are considered with a (non-symmetric) independent-private-value model of valuations. It shall be demonstrated that a utility equivalence principle holds for an agent if and only if she has constant absolute risk aversion.

Keywords: Utility equivalence; Risk averse agents (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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DOI: 10.2202/1534-5971.1197

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