A Spatial Election with Common Values

Maravall-Rodriguez Carlos ()
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Maravall-Rodriguez Carlos: Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Carlos Maravall Rodriguez ()

The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, 2006, vol. 6, issue 1, 19

Abstract: This paper extends the Downsian-Hotelling model of electoral competition to allow for unobserved qualitative differences between candidates. I show that these underlying qualitative differences generate pure strategy Nash equilibria, even if policies are defined in a multidimensional space, and explain platform divergence from the median. Moreover, the extension gives content to a second (well-known) role elections play apart from bridging conflict: to reveal information about candidates.

Keywords: spatial election; imperfect information; common values; valence issues (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006
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Working Paper: A spatial election with common values (2005)
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DOI: 10.2202/1534-5971.1269

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