Imitation and Long Run Outcomes

Jayasri Dutta () and Kislaya Prasad

The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, 2004, vol. 4, issue 1, 36

Abstract: In a number of evolutionary models the presence of mutations, or random components of choice, serve to refine predictions of long-run behavior. We analyze the effects of mutation rates that vary because of the presence of imitation. A full characterization of long-run outcomes is provided for familiar coordination and congestion games, and also a number of other games not previously considered within the evolutionary framework. Our results are often quite distinct from those in the literature. We apply these tools to a series of economic applications, including market games, where imitation can explain excess volatility of prices, and location games, where it leads to greater uniformity in choices.

Keywords: Imitation; Evolutionary Games; Long Run Outcomes (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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DOI: 10.2202/1534-598X.1163

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