Citizen Candidacy With Asymmetric Information

Georges Casamatta () and Wilfried Sand-Zantman

The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, 2006, vol. 5, issue 1, 41

Abstract: We extend a simple version of the citizen candidacy model (developed by Osborne-Slivinski (1996) and Besley-Coate (1997)) to an asymmetric information setting, in which the type of a given individual is assumed to be private information. Focusing on a particular class of perfect Bayesian equilibria, we show that there exist only two kinds of equilibria. In the first one, both non-median types become candidates and those equilibria generalize to any number of (potential) candidates. In the second one, only one of the non-median types chooses to become candidates for the election and those equilibria hold for a number of (potential) candidates at most equal to 3. This is in sharp contrast with the complete information framework in which only the median type individuals stand for office when the entry cost is sufficiently low.

Keywords: information; political competition (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006
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Working Paper: Citizen Candidacy with Asymmetric Information (2006)
Working Paper: Citizen Candidacy with Asymmetric Information (2003)
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DOI: 10.2202/1534-598X.1244

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