Pareto Improving Lotteries and Voluntary Public Goods Provision

Alexander Karaivanov

The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, 2006, vol. 6, issue 1, 15

Abstract: This paper characterizes the utility possibility frontier resulting in a model of private voluntary provision of a public good. It is shown that ex-ante lotteries over resource distributions among the agents can be Pareto improving. A corollary is that an equal distribution of resources among the agents, or any distribution where all agents contribute in equilibrium, is always Pareto dominated by a lottery between two unequal distributions.

Keywords: public goods; private provision; lotteries; efficiency (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006
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DOI: 10.2202/1534-598X.1246

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