Local Political Elite, Partial Reform Symptoms, and the Business and Market Environment in Rural China

Zhang Qi and Liu Mingxing
Additional contact information
Zhang Qi: Northwestern University
Liu Mingxing: Peking University

Business and Politics, 2010, vol. 12, issue 1, 1-41

Abstract: In this article we examine how Chinese local officials impact rural business environment and market development since the late 1990s. If their power is not effectively checked by village elections, local political elite are able to manipulate reform policies in a way to serve their economic and political interests at the cost of villagers' interests. In other words, local officials selectively implement reform policies not only to maximize economic rents available for extraction but also to minimize the risk that may challenge their rent-seeking capacity in the countryside. We draw on a survey data collected by the authors from rural China in 2003 and 2004 to test our hypothesis on the relationship between political control exercised by local officials over village elections and rural business environment & market development. Our analysis shows that if a local government can keep a village elections under its control, then local officials would charge more license application fees from self-employment business owners, put village land re-allocation process under government administrative control, restrict peasants from founding their own professional associations. Local officials' self-serving strategy inevitably deteriorates rural business & market environment and bodes an incomplete market-oriented reform for reformists in the central government.

Date: 2010
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.2202/1469-3569.1265 (text/html)
For access to full text, subscription to the journal or payment for the individual article is required.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bpj:buspol:v:12:y:2010:i:1:n:5

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
https://www.cambridg ... usiness-and-politics

DOI: 10.2202/1469-3569.1265

Access Statistics for this article

Business and Politics is currently edited by Vinod K. Aggarwal

More articles in Business and Politics from De Gruyter
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Peter Golla ().