Antitrust enforcement by state attorneys general: institutional, legal and political considerations

John Dove

Business and Politics, 2014, vol. 16, issue 2, 22

Abstract: Since deregulation in 1980, there has been a major shift in antitrust enforcement to the states, specifically to state attorneys general (AGs). For advocates of deregulation, this move has had important unintended consequences. Specifically, it has allowed antitrust litigation to become hitched to the political incentives of AGs. Analysis of a panel dataset of all state antitrust actions between 1990 and 2008 suggests that antitrust enforcement by state attorneys general appears to follow electoral cycles, which is especially pronounced depending on specific institutional constraints that exist between the states.

Date: 2014
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1515/bap-2013-0032 (text/html)
For access to full text, subscription to the journal or payment for the individual article is required.

Related works:
Journal Article: Antitrust enforcement by state attorneys general: institutional, legal and political considerations (2014)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bpj:buspol:v:16:y:2014:i:2:p:22:n:4

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
https://www.cambridg ... usiness-and-politics

DOI: 10.1515/bap-2013-0032

Access Statistics for this article

Business and Politics is currently edited by Vinod K. Aggarwal

More articles in Business and Politics from De Gruyter
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Peter Golla ().