Whom do European corporations lobby? The domestic institutional determinants of interest group activity in the European Union

Ehrlich Sean D. () and Jones Eryn
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Jones Eryn: Florida State University – Political Science, Tallahassee, FL, USA

Business and Politics, 2016, vol. 18, issue 4, 467-488

Abstract: The complicated and multi-layered policymaking process in the European Union presents private interests, such as business firms, with an interesting strategic choice of whom and how to lobby. As the costs of lobbying at the domestic level increase, firms are expected to, instead, devote their resources to lobbying at the European level. Specifically, this article examines how domestic access points and domestic partisanship affect the costs and benefits of lobbying at the domestic versus European level. Using data on firm-level decisions to lobby the EU, this research finds that in countries where is it more costly (or less beneficial) to lobby domestically, firms are more likely to lobby at the EU level.

Date: 2016
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DOI: 10.1515/bap-2015-0039

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