Targeting Corporate Political Strategy: Theory and Evidence from the U.S. Accounting Industry

Vanden Bergh Richard G and Holburn Guy L.F.
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Vanden Bergh Richard G: University of Vermont
Holburn Guy L.F.: University of Western Ontario

Business and Politics, 2007, vol. 9, issue 2, 1-33

Abstract: By analyzing the interaction between a business firm and multiple government institutions (including a regulatory agency, an executive and a bicameral legislature), we develop predictions about how firms target their political strategies at different branches of government when seeking more favorable public policies. The core of our argument is that firms will target their resources at the institution that is 'pivotal' in the policy-making process. We develop a simple framework, drawing on the political science literature, which identifies pivotal institutions in different types of political environments. We find empirical support for our thesis in an analysis of how U.S. accounting firms shifted their political campaign contributions between the House and Senate in response to the threat of new regulations governing auditor independence during the 1990s.

Date: 2007
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DOI: 10.2202/1469-3569.1202

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