The Connections among the US, China and Russia through Safe Assets

Rongyu Wang

China Finance and Economic Review, 2024, vol. 13, issue 3, 83-112

Abstract: This paper addresses the following problem: how debt chains sewed through government bonds are operated under either full commitment or limited commitment of the valuation of the debt by bond issuing countries. This paper takes the debt relationship of the US, China and Russia as an example to study the problem. This paper finds that even under the full commitment situation, the debt chain is hard to maintain in some circumstances. In the limited-commitment situation, even if safe asset issuance is a reflection of a country’s financial power, because China’s safe asset issued to Russia is denoted by USD, whether or not China encounters Triffin dilemma is ultimately determined by the US.

Keywords: international monetary system; nash bargaining; safe asset; triffin dilemma (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bpj:cferev:v:13:y:2024:i:3:p:83-112:n:1005

DOI: 10.1515/cfer-2024-0017

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