Some Reflections on the Self-insider and the Market Abuse Regulation – The Self-insider as a Monopoly-Square Insider

Lombardo Stefano
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Lombardo Stefano: Associate Professor of Economic Law, Faculty of Economics and Management, Free University of Bozen-Bolzano, Bolzano Italy; ECGI Research Member; CRELE (Center for Research in Law and Economics, UNIBZ) Research Associate. A very preliminary version of this article was presented at the Insider Trading Conference organized at the Faculty of Economics and Management of the Free University of Bozen-Bolzano on October 25–26, 2019.

European Company and Financial Law Review, 2021, vol. 18, issue 1, 2-33

Abstract: This article deals with the self-insider, i. e. the possible creation of the inside information by a person and its (abusive) exploitation. It describes the situation in Germany and in Italy and provides a taxonomy of the several cases of self-insider. The article then analyzes the case law of the ECJ and the MAR regulatory provisions for justifying/neglecting the existence of the self-insider (Article 9.5 and 9.6 MAR). Given the unclear regulatory answer regarding its sanctionability, the article proposes, based on the economics of MAR, a law and economics reason of why the self-insider sometime should be sanctioned, by describing it as a peculiar monopolistic behavior able to distort investors’ confidence and market integrity. Finally, the article suggests that the European legislator should explicitly deal with the problem.

Keywords: Market Abuse Regulation; MAR; insider dealing; insider trading; self-insider; selfinsider; inside information; insider of itself; insider di se stesso; selbstgeschaffene innere Tatsachen; takeover; takeover for delisting (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
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DOI: 10.1515/ecfr-2021-0004

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