Go Preventive or Go Home – The Double Nature of MREL

Martino Edoardo D. () and Parchimowicz Katarzyna M. ()
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Martino Edoardo D.: Postdoctoral Researcher at the Amsterdam Center for Law & Economics, Research Associate at European Banking Institute.The NetherlandsAmsterdamUniversity of Amsterdam (UvA)
Parchimowicz Katarzyna M.: Postdoctoral Researcher at the University of Wroclaw, Young Researcher at the European Banking Institute.Poland

European Company and Financial Law Review, 2021, vol. 18, issue 4, 608-639

Abstract: Bank Resolution is considered a cornerstone of the post-crisis financial regulation; however, it is also widely considered ineffective and inefficient in handling bank failures. This article analyses the preventive potential of the resolution framework, specifically focusing on the minimum requirement for own funds and eligible liabilities (MREL). We argue that MREL has a double nature. On the one hand, it should ensure the feasibility of resolution in case of a bank failure. On the other hand, it aims at restricting the funding model of banks, similarly to the other (preventive) capital requirements. By analysing the 2019 reform of the EU banking regulation, we contend that MREL represents an important complement to the rest of the preventive regulatory framework and that the latest reform unleashes such potential. We demonstrate that the new rules on MREL determination and enforcement allow the resolution authority to look after the build-up of systemic risk. The analysis reveals that MREL can serve both micro- and macro-prudential purposes. Finally, we argue that the current institutional architecture represents the main impeding factor for the new regulation to efficiently work, curbing the positive preventive potential of MREL.

Keywords: BRRD II; Bank Resolution; MREL; Preventive Regulation; Macro-Prudential Regulation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G21 G28 K23 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
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DOI: 10.1515/ecfr-2021-0023

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