White Knights and Black Knights – Does the Search for Competitive Bids always Benefit the Shareholders of “Target” Companies? –

Mucciarelli Federico M ()
Additional contact information
Mucciarelli Federico M: Bologna University, Faculty of Economics – federico.

European Company and Financial Law Review, 2006, vol. 3, issue 4, 408-425

Abstract: According to the EC Directive on Takeover Bids, defensive measures should be authorised by the general meeting of the target company. The incumbent board can, nonetheless, search for a competing bid, a so-called “white knight”. The rationale underpinning this exception is that competing bids always benefit target's shareholders. In this paper I will tackle this rationale, arguing that even competing bids could generate a pressure to tender on target's shareholders and, therefore, in this case should not be considered as a benefit for them.

Date: 2006
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1515/ECFR.2006.018 (text/html)
For access to full text, subscription to the journal or payment for the individual article is required.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bpj:eucflr:v:3:y:2006:i:4:p:408-425:n:4

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
https://www.degruyter.com/journal/key/ecfr/html

DOI: 10.1515/ECFR.2006.018

Access Statistics for this article

European Company and Financial Law Review is currently edited by Heribert Hirte

More articles in European Company and Financial Law Review from De Gruyter
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Peter Golla ().