Conflicts of Interest of Target Company's Directors and Shareholders in Leveraged Buy-Outs

Vicari Andrea
Additional contact information
Vicari Andrea: University of Milan School of Law, Milan, Italy.

European Company and Financial Law Review, 2007, vol. 4, issue 3, 346-369

Abstract: The article analyses a number of characteristic cases of target company's directors and shareholders conflicts of interest in leveraged buy-outs, noting that such cases have not been extensively studied by European researchers and addressed by the judiciary of the European countries. There is reason to believe that, on the basis of an interpretation applying general legal principles, the possibility that the directors and shareholders of the target will use the operation to achieve extra-company interests is potentially high. As a consequence, the article proposes a different, more rigorous interpretation of the laws on conflict of interest of directors and shareholders.

Date: 2007
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1515/ECFR.2007.020 (text/html)
For access to full text, subscription to the journal or payment for the individual article is required.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bpj:eucflr:v:4:y:2007:i:3:p:346-369:n:2

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
https://www.degruyter.com/journal/key/ecfr/html

DOI: 10.1515/ECFR.2007.020

Access Statistics for this article

European Company and Financial Law Review is currently edited by Heribert Hirte

More articles in European Company and Financial Law Review from De Gruyter
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Peter Golla ().