The Two-Tier Model and the One-Tier Model of Corporate Governance in the Italian Reform of Corporate Law

Ghezzi Federico and Malberti Corrado
Additional contact information
Ghezzi Federico: Bocconi University, Milan.
Malberti Corrado: Bocconi University, Milan.

European Company and Financial Law Review, 2008, vol. 5, issue 1, 1-47

Abstract: This article explores the Italian reform of corporate law of 2003, which, for the first time, allowed corporations to choose among three different models of corporate governance. In addition to the traditional model, which has been significantly modernized by the reform, two other “alternative” systems of governance were introduced: the two-tier system, which owes its basic structure to the German tradition, and the one-tier system which derives from the Anglo-American tradition. Taking into account the initial goals of the Italian legislature in designing the reform, we describe how the alternative board structures have been implemented in Italian practice, and provide an overview of the initial predictions about their advantages and disadvantages. We argue that Italy has taken an innovative approach to corporate governance that may be useful for other European countries interested in granting corporations the power to choose between board structures. However, analyzing some empirical evidence on the first effects of the reform, we also recognize that, even if courageous, the reform so far was not particularly successful in attracting corporations to the new models.

Date: 2008
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1515/ecfr.5.1.1 (text/html)
For access to full text, subscription to the journal or payment for the individual article is required.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bpj:eucflr:v:5:y:2008:i:1:p:1-47:n:1

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
https://www.degruyter.com/journal/key/ecfr/html

DOI: 10.1515/ecfr.5.1.1

Access Statistics for this article

European Company and Financial Law Review is currently edited by Heribert Hirte

More articles in European Company and Financial Law Review from De Gruyter
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Peter Golla ().