The Universal Succession as a Technique of Corporate Restructuring: Efficiency and Limits

Couret Alain
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Couret Alain: *Professor of Law at the Sorbonne University (Paris I), Director of the Financial Law Research Center, Attorney at Law (CMS-BFL).

European Company and Financial Law Review, 2009, vol. 6, issue 4, 373-390

Abstract: In many legal regimes, corporate restructuring operations are facilitated by the universal succession mechanism applied especially to operations of fusions, scissions and partial mergers. The universal succession is a particularly efficient instrument for the realization of those operations because it enables, notably, dissolutions without liquidation. However, we notice that this mechanism, likely to be applied generally and automatically, encounters various obstacles with different legal systems, French law bringing many illustrations of conflicts of principles limiting the scope of the universal succession.

Date: 2009
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DOI: 10.1515/ECFR.2009.373

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